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We consider the privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) of which markets 
can be opened to competition once privatization takes place and competitors can 
compete successfully against them in a few years. The currently used "Revenue 
Maximization (RM)" scheme maximizes the government revenue from privatization 
but does not provide incentives for the privatized SOE to charge a price lower than 
the monopoly price until competition arises. We propose the "Welfare Maximization 
(WMY scheme, which induces the privatized SOE to charge a competitive price 
without resorting to regulation. Also, WM provides greater incentives for pnst-pri- 
vatization cost reduction. 
Keywords: State-owned enterprises (SOEs); Privatization; Revenue Maximization 
Scheme; Welfare Maximization Scheme 
1. Introduction 
Privatization policies have been used in more than 80 countries throughout 
the world recently (see Vuylsteke (1988)). In these countries, depending on 
'Corresponding author: (305) 348 2735 (office phone #); (305) 348 1524 
(fax #); anbarcin@servms.fiu.edu (internet address) 
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74 Nejat Anbarci and Mehmet E. Karaaslan 
the type of post-privatization market structure that the privatized State- 
Owned Enterprise (SOE) will face, the degree of difficulty of implementing 
privatization varies. For instance, when the SOE already operates in a com- 
petitive market, privatization is relatively straightforward since a privatized 
SOE without market power presumably will not cause any efficiency loss. 
When the SOE in question is a natural monopoly, regulation has been the 
conventional framework to deal with the issue. 
Many SOE's, however, neither operate in competitive markets nor qual- 
ify to be considered as natural monopolies. In many cases, at some point 
of their existence, these SOEs had been established and/or declared as 
legal monopolies by their governments. Most of these legal-monopoly 
SOEs in many countries are such that, when their markets are opened to 
competition once privatization takes place (i.e., when their monopoly sta- 
tus is abolished), in a few years time other competitors can emerge and 
compete successfully against them. But until competition arrives, these pri- 
vatized SOEs may have a significant level of market power. Such a post-pri- 
vatization market power necessarily implies that the social welfare is not 
maximized during that interim period. 
In this paper, we propose a new scheme to privatize such SOEs which 
have had legal monopoly status as described above. We term this new 
scheme the "Welfare Maximization" (WM) scheme. The WM scheme 
induces the privatized SOE to charge an almost competitive price in the 
absence of any regulation. Currently, the "Revenue Maximization" (RM) 
scheme is commonly used; this scheme maximizes the government revenue 
from privatization but does not provide any incentives for the privatized 
SOE to charge a price lower than the monopoly price until serious compe- 
tition arises (in some cases, the monopoly status of the SOE that gets pri- 
vatized is not even abolished; i.e., the privatized SOE is allowed to make 
monopoly profits in the long run too-we will not consider this extreme 
case in this paper). 
We compare the WM and RM schemes in two respects. Our first main 
result (Proposition 3) is that the WM scheme does not only provide a high- 
er total social welfare than the RM scheme does but it also results in a high- 
er consumer surplus and higher profits for the privatized SOE-interest- 
ingly, the latter happens although the privatized SOE charges a lower price 
under the WM scheme. It also turns out that the WM scheme provides more 
incentives for post-privatization cost reduction (Proposition 4). In the 
Concluding Remarks, we discuss how this paper relates to Demsetz (1968)'s 
seminal paper "Why Regulate Utilities?" 
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An Effient Privatization Mechanism 75 
2. Regulation, the "Ideal Outcome," and Auctions 
Even if the sector in which such a SOE (that has been a legal monopoly 
but not a natural monopoly) operates is opened to competition as soon as 
it is privatized, presumably for a while no serious competition can take 
place against the privatized SOE that can generate net welfare gains. Thus, 
in the absence of such an immediate invasion of this market by competi- 
tive firms, one way one could think of making the post-privatization SOE 
behave as competitively as possible is to have some form of regulation. The 
costs of forming a regulatory body to monitor that firm (that it is not a nat- 
ural monopoly) and using a significant amount of resources to learn the 
firm's cost and demand conditions, however, may not justlfy the potential 
benefits from regulating that firm in the interim period (regulation even in 
the presence of long-term and thus less asymmetric relationships, can be 
ineffective and can have undesirable indirect effects (see Averch and 
Johnson (1962), and Braeutigam and Panzar (19891, for instance)).' 
Suppose the government knew which potential buyer of a SOE had the 
lowest (constant marginal) cost; assume for simplicity that there is only one 
such firm. Let that cost be c* (which can be considered as the expected 
value of possible marginal costs). Then the government can have a pre- 
condition that, in order to enter the auction to acquire that SOE, each firm 
has to agree to pay the liquidation value of the assets upon winning the 
auction and charge a post-privatization SOE product price p = c * . ~  Then 
only the firm with cost c* would be able to enter this auction and thus win 
(any other firm would make losses if it committed to the same low post- 
privatization product price). This would be the "ideal" outcome for the 
society since it maximizes the social welfare. The government, however, 
typically does not know which firm has the lowest cost and what that cost 
is. Therefore, in the real-life version of the above example, the government 
will most likely regret that it set the product price too high or too low. In 
either case, the government's best bet is to revise the required product 
price in the appropriate direction after it observes either many positive 
product-price bids by the potential buyers of the SOE or no such bids (such 
a revision of the product price by the government can take place many 
times-it may even follow a repeated back-and-forth path). This, however, 
is a costly way of implementing the above-mentioned "ideal" outcome. 
Instead, direct competitive bidding procedures can be much more prefer- 
able in the sale of ~ 0 ~ s . ~  
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76 Nejat Anbarci and Mehmet E. Karaaslan 
There are two types of sealed-bid auctions in use: the first-price sealed- 
bid auction (FPSB), and the second-price sealed-bid auction (SPSB). Under 
FPSB, potential buyers submit sealed bids and the highest bidder is award- 
ed the item for the price he bid. Under SPSB, bidders submit sealed bids 
having told that the highest bidder wins the item but pays a price equal to 
the second-highest bid. SPSB auction economizes on information gathering 
and bid preparation costs. Although no bidder knows the level of the best 
bid, it turns out that it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to bid exact- 
ly his own true valuation of the item. In FPSB, each bidder's bid depends 
on his beliefs about the distribution of the other bidders' valuations (as well 
as his risk preference and his beliefs about the distribution of the other bid- 
ders' risk aversion levels). Thus, FPSB may entail significant information 
gathering and bid preparation costs. (For more on "auctions and bidding" 
literature, see excellent surveys by McAfee and McMillan (1987), and 
Milgrom (19881.) 
3. The "RM* and "WM* Schemes, and The Results 
Throughout our analysis, we will assume that the output of the privatized 
SOE can properly and precisely be specified, the technology is relatively 
simple, and the future development of demand and technology is fairly 
predictable; many SOEs ifi many countries are in sectors such as sugar pro- 
cessing, cellulose and paper products, petroleum products, glass, iron, 
steel, cement, etc., and these sectors share most of the above characteris- 
tics. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, we will compare the WM scheme to 
the RM scheme. Define the social welfare as W = CS + PS + G where CS is 
consumer surplus, PS is producer surplus, and G is government revenue. It 
is a well-known result that "any increase in a firm's PS is an increase in that 
firm's profits x"; i.e., PS = x + k where k is some constant. Thus, the social 
welfare can also be defined as W = CS + n+ G + k. 
We will consider the following (inverse) demand function for the prod- 
uct that the SOE produces, p(q) = a - (b/x)qx, with 0 > x > - 1 as well as 
x = 1 (observe that, when x = 1, we have the linear inverse demand func- 
tion p(q) = a - bq) where p denotes the product price, q denotes the out- 
put level and a, b > o . ~  A "firm" refers to any stakeholder that enters the 
bidding to take over the privatized SOE. Each firm is assumed to be risk- 
neutral and to know its expected cost; it does not, however, know the other 
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An Eflicient Privatization Mechanism 77 
firms' expected costs (in other words, we assume that for any firm it is very 
costly to get information on the other firms' costs). Let ci be the constant 
(expected) marginal cost of Firm i; the simplifying "constant marginal cost" 
assumption can also be justified as an approximation of the relevant range 
of the marginal cost curve. 
I 
I Index all firms according to their cost rankings such that the least cost 
firm is called Firm 1, the second least cost firm is called Firm 2, and so on. 
Given its cost c let pim be the monopoly price that Firm i would charge 
i' 
l 
and n k  be its monopoly profit if it took over the privatized SOE and had 
the monopoly status during the interim period. To avoid some unnecessary 
1 complications, we assume that each c i  is independently and identically dis- 
tributed and that any two ci, c , + ~  are arbitrarily close. 
! The RM scheme is such that the government holds an auction in which 
each firm has to bid how much it would pay to acquire the privatized SOE; 
the firm that bids the highest acquisition price wins the bidding and takes 
over the privatized SOE but must pay the second highest bidder's acquisi- 
tion price. That is, the government uses a second-price sealed-bid auction. 
The winner can charge any price after it takes over the privatized SOE. 
LEiMMA I .  Under the RM scheme, Firm 1 wins the auction by paying an 
acquisition price to the government equal to nZm. Firm 1 charges plm after 
it takes over the privatized SOE. 
The proof of Lemma 1 is straightforward: In a second-price sealed-bid 
auction, each firm bids its reservation price. In this case, it means that each 
Firm i will bid nim. Thus, Firm 1 will have made the highest bid and con- 
sequently will win the auction. By the procedure of the RM scheme, Firm 
1 then will have to pay nZm to the government in order to take over the 
privatized SOE. Since it is allowed to charge any product price upon after 
taking over the privatized SOE, Firm 1 will charge plm. 
Remark I :  Should the government use FPSB rather than SPSB? Under 
"risk neutrality" and "symmetric independent private values," the two auc- 
tions generate the same amount of revenue for the seller. When only the 
risk neutrality is replaced by risk aversion, this revenue-equivalence result 
does not hold anymore in that FPSB generates more revenue. On the other 
hand, when only the "symmetric independent private values" are replaced 
by "positively correlated beliefs" (i.e., high own valuation makes it more 
likely that rival bidders' valuations are high as well), then SPSB generates 
more revenue. In reality, both risk aversion and correlated beliefs are pre- 
sent to some extent; thus, it would be difficult to predict which auction 
would yield higher revenue to the government. In all these cases, however, 
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78 Nejat Anbarci and Mehmet E. Karaaslan 
the behavior of the bidders under SPSB is the same: they bid their true 
reservation prices. The difference is their behavior under FPSB. In this 
paper, for tractability purposes, we assume risk neutrality and symmetric 
independent values. Thus, under these circumstances the government does 
not prefer one auction over the other. But because of the above-mentioned 
features of SPSB, it becomes more prominent in modelling a bidding situ- 
ation. 
The KMscheme is such that the government holds an auction in which 
each firm has to agree to pay the predetermined liquidation value of the 
assets of the SOE upon winning the auction and bid what product price it 
will charge if it became the owner of the privatized SOE; the firm that bids 
the lowest product price wins the bidding and cannot charge a price high- 
er than the second lowest bidder's product price after it takes over the pri- 
vatized SOE. (Many countries have positive inflation levels. Thus, one 
needs to specify a requirement concerning the highest product price the 
firm can charge in the subsequent years; an intuitive requirement would be 
that this price cannot increase faster than the inflation rate or the retail price 
index each subsequent year.) 
Remark 2: Multi-commodity firms. Many SOEs are multi-commodity 
firms. Since each such SOE has been a legal monopoly, it might also be 
desirable to break and auction it separately, if it is possible to separate its 
activities and identlfy its market segments with respect to elasticities of 
demand without causing any efficiency loss. However, this may not always 
be possible. In that case the firms should bid a vector of prices. If a firm 
offers a lower price for each commodity (or submarket), then that firm 
should acquire that SOE. Otherwise, weights can be assigned to various 
commodities (and/or quality levels); these weights can be based on the vol- 
ume of sales of these commodities in recent years. Whichever firm offers 
the lowest average price given these weights should acquire the privatized 
firm. (It may not be wise, however, to allow the privatized firm to achieve 
only that average price rather than each price in the price vector it has 
offered since the former allows cross-subsidization which is allocatively 
inefficient and can deter future competition.) 
LEMMA 2. Under the WM scheme, Firm 1 wins the auction by bidding 
a product price plZ = cl. Firm 1 charges pl* - c2 after 'it takes over the pri- 
vatized SOE. 
Again, in a second-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder bids its reser- 
vation price. Thus, in our case, each Firm i will bid pi+ = ci. Thus, Firm 1 
will have made the lowest bid and consequently will win the auction. By 
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An Efficient Privatization Mechanism 79 ! 
the procedure of the WM scheme, Firm 1 then will have to charge pl* - c2 
after it takes over the privatized SOE. 
PROPOSI77ON I .  (i) The product price, p,*, under the WM scheme is I 
lower than the product price, plm under the & scheme. (ii) A higher out- 
put is produced under the WM scheme than under the RM scheme. (iii) 
Consumer surplus is larger under the WM scheme than under the RM 
scheme. 
Prooj (i) It follows from the facts that (a) by Lemmas 1 and 2, Firm 1 
is the winner under both schemes, (b) for a monopolist Firm 1, > cl, 
and since any two ci, c, are assumed to be arbitrarily close, there is 
A+ ' 
always some c2 E (cl,pl ) and by Lemma 2 we have plt = c2, 
(ii) It directly follows from Part (i) of this Proposition and the facts that 
(a) by Lemmas 1 and 2, Firm 1 is the winner under both schemes, and (b) 
the demand curve it faces, p(q), is downward sloping. 
(iii) It directly follows from Parts (i) and (ii) of this Proposition and the 
facts that (a) by Lemmas 1 and 2, Firm 1 is the winner under both schemes, 
\ 
ua 
FIGURE 1 Walfare Comparisons under the WM and RM Schemes 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
6:4
9 1
4 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
80 Nejat Anbarci and Mehmet E. Karaaslan 
and (b) the demand curve p(q) is downward sloping. 
PROPOSl77ON 2. Firm 1's profit is larger under the WM scheme; conse- 
quently, the producer surplus is larger under the WM scheme. 
ProoJ By Proposition l(i), plm > pl* = c By Lemma 1, under the RM 2' 
scheme, Firm 1 wins the auction and ends up paying the amount of prof- 
its Firm 2 bids. Thus, Firm 1, charging a monopoly price, keeps the differ- 
ence between nlm(cl) - n (c2) (in the linear case, it is equal to the trape- 2 
zoid c2dfcl in Figure lb) where ym(cl) denotes Firm i's monopoly profits. 
By Lemma 2, under the WM scheme Firm 1 wins the auction and ends up 
charging a product price equal to the marginal cost of Firm 2. pl* = c2 yields 
some profits for Firm 1 since c2 > cl by assumption; let S denote that prof- 
it (in the linear case, it is equal to the rectangle c2uvc1 in Figure la). Thus, 
we need to compare S to nlm(cl) - n (c,), and Lemma 3 in the Appendix J 
establishes that S is greater than 5 (cl) - 5m ( c ~ ) . ~  Since, an increase in 
profit is an increase in producer surplus, the WM scheme entails a higher 
producer surplus than the RM scheme does. 
Remark 3: How long to mandatep*? Does p' deter entry meanwhile? It 
is reasonable to mandate p* for the period of time that is deemed as the 
shortest possible lag after which potential competitors will be able to start 
producing that product. The long-term effects of privatization on future 
competition (or on entry deterrence) under the WM scheme should be 
evaluated by considering what would have occurred under the RM scheme. 
The MM scheme provides incentives for entry to only those firms that have 
costs below (or around) the existing price. Typically, the farther is the price 
set from the competitive level (as would be the case under the RM scheme), 
the greater would be the likelihood that the firm will engage in strategic 
pricing to deter entry to protect its rents which entails costly signalling. 
Thus, there is much less room for strategic behavior (such as predatory and 
limit pricing) under the WM scheme than under the RM scheme. Under the 
RM scheme, if the monopolist does not engage in strategic behavior, then 
unlike the situation under the WM scheme high cost firms too may enter 
the market (which is an inefficient outcome). If, on the other hand, the 
monopolist does engage in strategic behavior, then--depending on the 
potential entrants' beliefs about its costs-entry may be blocked against 
low cost firms but may not be blocked against high cost firms (both of 
which are inefficient outcomes). In addition, entry under the RM scheme is 
more likely to result in collusion given that the initial sustained high price 
may serve as the focal price and that the gains from collusion are signifi- 
cant. 
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I PROPOSZ77ON 3. The WM scheme Pareto-dominates the RM scheme. 
It immediately follows from Proposition l(iii) and Proposition 2. 6 
Remark 4: Loss in government revenue due to using the WM scheme 
rather than the RM scheme. One can also approach this result from the 
1 public finance point of view by asking whether a government currently 
I using the RM scheme can find an alternative source to offset its (potential) 
I revenue loss from privatization after switching to the WM scheme. The 
answer is in the affirmative since such a switch to the WM scheme gener- 1 ates an increase in the consumer surplus greater than the government's loss 
I of potential privatization revenue; thus, under the WM scheme a transfer 
from the consumers to the government (equal to the government's revenue 
loss) can maintain the government's revenue and improve the consumers' 
welfare compared to the outcome under the RM scheme. One practical way 
to achieve that is to levy a differential income tax to the segments of soci- 
ety that use the commodity most such that government's total revenue is 
the same as what it would be under the RM scheme. Nevertheless, raising 
government revenue, as argued in the privatization literature, should not be 
a primary concern of a government that undertakes privatization. 
In order to reach a lower cost c' < cl, Firm 1 has to go through a process 
invention which requires investment of resources. Suppose that in order to 
achieve such a cost reduction, the firm must commit an initial investment 
of r amount of resources. Then, if there are two situations such that Firm 1 
obtains a higher increase in profits due to that cost reduction in one case 
than in the other case, then one would say that Firm 1 has more incentives 
to undergo the required process invention in the former rather than in the 
latter case; this is because, after the cost reduction, when Firm 1 earns addi- 
tional profits in excess of r in the former case it might not earn that much 
(or might simply have losses) in the latter case. Our last result states that 
Firm 1 would earn more due to a cost reduction under the WM scheme 
than under the RM scheme. Thus, 
PROPOSIl7ON 4. There are more incentives for process invention under 
the WM scheme. 
The proof of Proposition 4 mimics that of Lemma 3 in the Appendix (to 
see that, one only needs to replace cl by c' and c2 by cl in that proof). 
Remark 5: Incentives for product innovation. An equally important 
question is under which scheme would the winning firm have more incen- 
tives for product innovation. The key here is to require that the privatized 
firm under WM scheme provides the initial base-quality commodity at price 
p* as much as the public demands it. Then the firm can be allowed to 
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82 Nejat Anbarci and Mehmet E. Karaaslan 
charge a monopoly price for the new commodity. In order to make a rea- 
sonable comparison we need to make some simplifying assumptions. One 
such assumption is that the new commodity's cost too is cl. In addition, 
although our claim can still hold under the general domain that the sale of 
each unit of the new product replaces the sale of at most one unit of the 
old product (i.e., introduction of the new product may generate growth in 
the total volume of output produced by the firm in both product lines), for 
tractability purposes we will assume that there is one-to-one replacement 
between the old and new products. For that purpose, we also assume that 
some people prefer the new commodity and some prefer the old com- 
modity. 
Consider the linear demand case, p(q) = a - bq. Suppose that in the case 
of the RM scheme, when the firm introduces the new product, the demand 
shifts down as illustrated in Figure 2a; i.e., the inverse demand now is p(q) 
= a' - bq. Suppose that p(n) and p(o) are the monopoly prices of the new 
and old products, and that consumers are in equilibrium such that their 
marginal utilities per dollar are the same (i.e., MU(n)/p(n) = MU(o)/p(o)). 
FIGURE 2 The Effects of Product Quality under the WM and RM Schemes 
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An Efficient Privatization Mechanism 83 
Clearly, p(n) > p* and p(o) > p*. Then, it is easy to see that in the case of 
the WM scheme, MU(n)/p(n) > MU(o)/p* cannot hold. Therefore, 
MU(n)/p(n) 5 MU(o)/p* must hold. Take the MU(n)/p(n) = MU(o)/p* case 
first. This will imply that the shift in the old commodity's demand under the 
WM scheme too will be the same as under RM scheme; i.e., p(q) = a' - bq. 
Then observe that the winning firm, which will behave as a monopoly in 
selling the new product, will have the same gains from selling it under both 
schemes since the same amount of the new product will be sold under 
both schemes. 
Now, let us compare the profit losses in the old commodity the winning 
firm will experience under both schemes. Let n denote the winning firm's 
monopoly profits under the RM scheme and let S denote its profits under 
the WM scheme. Initially, n = (a - c12/4b; with the new commodity, n'= (a' 
- c)'/4b. Initially, S = (c, - cl)(a - c2)/b; with the new commodity, S' = (c2 - 
cl>(a' - c z ) h  Thus, An = [(a - c)(a - c) - (a' - d(a' - c)1/4b, and AS = Kc2 - 
cl)(a - cz) - (c, - c,)(a' - cz)l/b (See Figure 2b and 2a.) Using some alge- 
bra, under some reasonable assumptions such as, "(c2 - cl) is some arbi- 
trarily small positive real number E" (which we have assumed throughout) 
and "a' 2 c," (i.e., it is still feasible for the winning firm under the WM 
scheme to produce the old commodity) as well as "a 2 c2 + 28," it is easy to 
see that An 7~ AS.7 
When MU(n)/p(n) < MU(o)/p*, a' is smaller in the WM scheme's case 
than in the RM scheme's case. But since the costs of the old and new com- 
modities are the same and the winning firm charges p* for the old com- 
modity and the corresponding monopoly price for the new commodity, it 
is easy to see that its gain is even bigger than the case when MU(n)/p(n) 
= MU(o)/p*. 
Remark 6: Risk can be reduced by tying p* to some cost indices. 
Occasionally, some costs may be outside of the privatized SOE's manage- 
ment's control and increase unexpectedly and well beyond the inflation 
rate; consequently the agreed upon product price may not cover the costs 
any more. Many countries compile major sectoral productivity and cost 
indices as well as monthly producer price indices. Depending on how long 
the winning firm is supposed to charge p* and how risk averse the bidding 
firms are, one might consider tying p* to the relevant cost indices. Clearly, 
however, a contractual arrangement that would allow re-evaluation and re- 
setting of p* whenever the firm claims that it cannot possibly produce at 
price p* anymore would amount to regulating that firm and defeat the pur- 
pose of the WM scheme. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
Demsetz (1968) in his important article "Why Regulate Utilities?" challenged 
the basic intellectual arguments for believing that truly effective public util- 
ity regulation is desirable. As an alternative to regulation, Demsetz (1969) 
proposed that the franchise be awarded annually to the competitor that 
offers supplying the product or service at the lowest price. As one can see, 
the privatization scheme we propose is in the spirit of Demsetz's franchis- 
ing idea. However, on a general domain, the franchising idea is not with- 
out criticisms. These criticisms apply in the context of public utility regula- 
tion, and they mostly stem from the presence of the periodical renewal of 
the franchising contract.'. On the other hand, they do not apply in the con- 
text of our privatization scheme since our framework does not entail any 
public utilities as well as any renewal of the franchising contract. 
Demsetz's franchising idea is more of a conjecture since, although con- 
ceptually he argued very rigorously that such a franchising would be desir- 
able for the society, he did not use a formal model to show that. We make 
his idea precise in a context where it can work without the difficulties it 
would entail in the repeated setting of its intended context of public utili- 
ties. 
Appendix 
LW.LMA 3. S > n,m(c2 - ","(c,'. 
Proof: Observe that ny(c? - [(a - C? - (b/x)qflqr = (a - c?qf - (b 
/x)~:'. The output level that maximizes profits is 9 = [x(a - c.)/(x + l)bll" 
Then the maximum profit becomes ~ : ~ ( c ; )  = [(a - c:)x/(x + l)lbl)/X(l/b)l/X. 
The winning firm under the RM &eke retain; ny(c? - n;"(c~ = [(a - 
(x+l)/x (x+l)/~*l/x(~ + l)(x+l)/x c$~+'" - (a - c2) lx . The winning firm under 
l/x l/x l/x the W M  scheme retains S - [(a - c ) - (a - c2)1(a - cl) x /b (x + 1)'". 
Let A -[(a - cl) (x+l)/x - (a -, )(x+lhyblh and A = [(a - cl) - (a - cJI(a - 
~ , ) ' / ~ / b ' / ~ ;  also, let B = x(~+')"/(x + l)(x+l)'x, and B'- x'lX/(x + l)l/X Then, 
observe that ~ ~ ( c , )  - nZm(c2) - AB, and S = A'B ' .~  In a straightforward 
manner in the case x = 1 and using some very long and tedious algebra in 
the case 0 z x > -1, we find that A' > A and B' > B. Thus, S > nlm(cl) - 
nzrn(c2). 
LEMMA 3'. Suppose that the demand is not necessarily linear but the 
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approximation n m(cl) - %m(~2)  1 (d,#(c2)/acXc2 - cl) can be used. Then 
rrf S > a 1 m(cl) - a2 (cZ). 
ProoJ: Let q(p) denote the quantity demanded at price p. Again, we 
need to compare qm(cl) - a2m(~2) with S = (c - cl)[(a - c2)/bl. Since cl is 
?n 
arbitrarily close to c2, we can write alm(cl) - a2 CCZ) - (dP(c2)/ac)(c2 - cl). 
Using the envelope theorem, afl(c2)/ac = -q(p 2 m), where p 2 is the 
monopoly price if unit cost is c2; thus, we have q(p2m)(~2 - cl). Since p2m 
> c and demand is downward sloping, it is immediate that nlm(cl) - 
m2 
a2 (cz) - q(p2"')(c2 - cl) < q(c*)(c2 - cl) = S. 
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Endnotes 
1. Typically, firms are much better informed than the regulators about cost and 
demand conditions, especially in the short run. Over time the regulators may 
overcome this information disadvantage to some extent; this, in our frame- 
work, does not resolve any problem, however, since the sectors we consider 
are such that the regulators will not even be needed in the medium- and 
long-run. 
2. The reason of requiring any bidder to pay the liquidation value of the assets 
of the SOE upon winning the auction is to discourage anyone from entering 
the auction with the intention of shutting down the operations and selling off 
those assets upon acquiring the SOE. (In the absence of any such require- 
ment, the amount of prospective earnings from such a sale of assets may 
exceed the producer surplus but may not cover any portion of the consumer 
surplus in addition; hence, in spite of the social inefficiency of such a sale of 
assets, the winning buyer of the SOE might have the incentives to sell them 
off. Such incentives may be strong especially in countries where capital assets 
have an active second hand market.) Also, the firm can be required to pro- 
vide universal service and to produce as much as the public would like to 
purchase at p - c*, otherwise it can lose (at least partially) the right to own 
and run the privatized SOE 
3. The two most common bidding methods in privatization have been "public 
offering of shares" and "private sale of shares." The advantage of the public 
offering of shares is to widen the ownership of the shares in the society. 
Private sale of shares may be the only feasible alternative in the absence of 
developed capital markets (where a public offering is difficult to carry out) 
andlor when the size of the enterprise may not justify a public offering. Even 
when the above-mentioned problems are not present, public offering of 
shares may lead to a corporate-governance problem; i.e., under public offer- 
ing, the SOEs' shares sold could be dispersed among the population without 
any blockholders emerging to monitor the managers and to enforce efficien- 
cy. This is a problem since many weak performing SOEs need strong owngrs 
("stakeholders") with relevant industrial, financial, commercial and other 
experiences and a high financial stake in the success of the firm since pre- 
sumably only such new owners can turn things around rather rapidly. 
4. Greenhaut and Greenhaut (1975) used this functional form first. When x > 1, 
p(q) is concave; when x = 0, p(q) is not well-defined. When x < 1 and x * 0, 
p(q) is convex; but when x < - 1, marginal revenue is upward sloping (when 
x = - 1, MR is constant). Thus, only the interval ( - 1,ll (excluding 0) is rea- 
sonable. Observe that when 1 > x > 0, the elasticity of demand decreases as 
output rises; on the other hand, when 0 > x > - 1, the elasticity of demand 
increases as output rises. One can make a case (as to which one is more real- 
istic) for each interval 1 > x > 0 and 0 > x > - 1 (observe that in the case 0 > 
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x > - 1 we also need that the assumption that "(x + l)/x is even" such that 
the profits are positive). The reason we are considering only the case 0 > x > 
- 1 (as well as the benchmark linear case x 6 1) is that in the case 1 > x > 0 
the results turn out to be ambiguous (as will be noted in the footnote in the 
Appendix) 
5. In the Appendix, (thanks to one of the referees) we have a result, Lemma 3', 
that generalizes this result further to include any nonlinear demand function 
by relying on a Taylor's approximation. 
6. One of the referees pointed out that although the RM scheme is not efficient, 
it may be a political equilibrium. Although pursuing such a political-econo- 
my approach can be fruitful, one should first evaluate and compare alterna- 
tive privatization schemes in terms of their economic properties (which is 
indeed the scope of this paper) before taking on the more complicated polit- 
ical-economy aspects of privatization. 
7 .  Observe that, a + a' 2 2c2 + 2.5; that is, a + a' 2 2c2 + 2(c2 - c,); 
a + a' 4c - 2cl, or a + a' + 4cl r 2cl + 4c2 
(a + a2)(a 2 a') + 4c (a - a') a 2c (a - a') + 4c (a - a') 
(a2 - a12) + 4c1a - 4c a1 2 2c a - h l a '  + 4c2a - 4cpg 
a: - 2c,a - 4c2a + 4c,a 2 ah - 2c,a2 - 4c a' + 4c1a1 
a + c - 2c a - 4c a + 4c1a r ay2 + c12 - ic1a2 - 4c2a9 + 4c1a2 
(a - c112 - 4(c2 - c j a  2 (a7 - c ~ ) ~  - 4(c - c )a' 
(a - c')' - 4(c, - c 1 )  + 4 - c )c a' - - 4(c - c )a2+ 4(c2 - cl)c2 
2 t P (a - c')' - 4(c - c )(a - c$z (a - c,) - 4(c2- c1Xa - c> 
1 2  2 2 (a - c > - (a' - c ) r 4(c, - c,Xa - c ) - 4(c2 - c,>(a' - c? 
[(a - - (a1 - Ll)']/4b r [(c2 - c1)& - c2) - (c2 - cl)(a - c,)l/b; thus, An z 
AS. 
8. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) mention some potential difficulties. The first one 
is that the current holder of a franchise might enjoy a strategic advantage 
when the franchise is up for renewal. Consequently, the future franchise is 
worth more to the incumbent firm than it is to other firms. This fact might 
deter the others from entering the renewal auction. Another difficulty arises 
when the incumbent operator of the franchise (call it A) has been defeated 
in the renewal auction. As Vickers and Yarrow (1988) put it "Unless sunk 
costs are zero.. .efficiency requires that B, the new operator of the franchise, 
takes over these assets from A. Otherwise there will be inefficient duplication 
of these assets. But how are the assets to be valued for this purpose? Here 
there is a problem of bilateral monopoly." Another source of incumbent 
advantages is that the incumbent operator of the franchise may be more like- 
ly to have superior knowledge of cost and demand conditions. Thus, if anoth- 
er firm outbids the incumbent, it is likely that it has bid too much (the 'win- 
ners curse') 
9. Observe that when the interval 1 > x > 0 is considered, we have B' > B but 
also A' < A. Thus, the result is ambiguous. 
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